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State Interference with Religiously




In today's world, most people, regardless of their religious faith,
have their injuries and diseases treated by medical doctors. Many
religious believers subscribe to the doctrine that, "God helps those
who help themselves." Yet, the more serious an illness becomes, the
more likely it is that the patient and his friends will also pray for his
recovery. In this manner, a great many religious believers can be
considered "part time" faith healers. With them the law has no
quarrel. Legal questions arise only with regard to those sects which
choose to treat injury or disease solely by means of prayer and faith.
Under our constitutional protections for religious freedom,
which prohibit any religious favoritism by the state, must not even
"extremist" groups be as free to follow their consciences as is the
majority? Basic to our principles of liberty and democracy is that
the majority is not always "right." Minorities also have a right to
exist, to propagate their ideas, and to practice their beliefs. It is in-
structive to remember that a minority condemned slavery, and ulti-
mately succeeded in its abolition.
This article will discuss the role of the state in regulating or
otherwise interfering with the medical treatment decisions of adults
and of parents for their children. It will conclude by urging that the
constitutional protections of religious freedom prohibit the state from
interfering with religiously motivated decisions regarding the render-
ing of medical care.
0 Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; A.B. Harvard University 1950; J.D.
John Marshall Law School 1966. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of his very
capable research assistant, Colleen Griffin; the suggestions and wise counsel of his faculty
colleague, Ardath Hamann; and the furnishing of materials and sources by his college class-
mate and friend, Brooks Wilder, General Counsel, The First Church of Christ, Scientist.
The author is a member of the Winnetka (Illinois) Congregational Church and has no
personal religious scruples against medical treatment of any kind.
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II. Refusal of Medical Treatment by Adults
A. In General
Except in emergencies, when consent is usually implied, a medi-
cal professional must obtain the patient's consent before performing
any medical or surgical procedure. This duty to obtain consent is a
corollary of the patient's right to self-determination, which was suc-
cinctly stated by Justice Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital:1 "Every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. '
There are many reasons patients refuse to consent to medical
treatment. For a terminally ill person who is being sustained on a
respirator or other machine, the artificial prolongation of life without
hope of recovery may not seem desirable. In other cases, fear of dis-
figurement, discomfort, pain, or even death may be the motivating
factor.' For some patients, religious beliefs may prohibit any form of
medical treatment, or at least certain medical procedures.5
It is generally accepted that, absent a compelling state interest,
competent adults are free to refuse medical treatment.6 This right of
refusal has long been recognized in the common law 7 and also exists
in the context of the constitutional rights of freedom of religion8 and
of privacy.8 That this right exists and must be honored is generally
1. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
2. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
3. E.g., refusal of surgery, chemotherapy, or amputation.
4. E.g., Christian Scientists or faith healers.
5. E.g., refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses.
6. E.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd 379 So.2d
359 (Fla. 1980) (a competent adult with no minor dependents, suffering from terminal illness,
has right to refuse or discontinue extraordinary medical treatment when all affected family
members consent); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (77-
year-old widow has right to refuse to submit to amputation of leg affected by gangrene).
It is also generally held that a guardian or other representative may exercise this right to
refuse treatment on behalf of a comatose or otherwise incompetent adult. See John F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Welfare of Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420
N.E.2d 64 (1981); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Leach v. Akron
General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, sub. nor., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
7. See Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1; see also ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 6.
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED DECISIONS
accepted' 0 even when the court and others may consider the person's
decision "unwise, foolish, or ridiculous."' 1
This right to refuse treatment, whether founded on constitu-
tional or common law precepts, is considered by many not to be ab-
solute; the state can assert a public interest that is alleged to over-
ride the rights or interests of the individual.'" The state interest
usually falls into one of the four following categories:
(1) the preservation of life.
(2) the protection of innocent third parties such as children.
(3) the prevention of suicide.
(4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.' 8
Since it is widely held that only a compelling state interest can over-
ride the rights of an individual,14 these four state interests are usu-
ally found to be insufficient to compel an individual to submit to
unwanted medical care.
The state often asserts, however, that "any exception to the
sanctity of life cannot but cheapen it.' 15 The state, therefore, pro-
motes respect for life by denying a patient's choice against treat-
ment. The flaw in this argument is that most patients who refuse
medical treatment are not choosing to die, although some may well
prefer death to the other alternatives available. The patient is merely
choosing an alternative which may result in death. It is doubtful that
the state's interest in preserving life can extend to the preservation of
life at any cost and in all circumstances. 6
10. See, e.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962) ("An
adult person, if he be of sound mind, is considered to have the right to determine for himself
whether a recommended treatment or surgery shall be performed upon him, and to have the
right to expressly prohibit life-saving surgery or other medical treatment"); In re Brown, 478
So.2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985) ("[T]he right to privacy is so personal that its protection does
not require the giving of a reason for its exercise.").
11. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623-24 (1973). See also In re President &
Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J. dissenting),
reh'g denied en banc, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). After quoting the
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) in which Justice
Brandeis strongly asserted the "right to be let alone," Judge Burger went on to state that
individuals possess this right not "only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emo-
tions, or well-founded sensations, [but also as to] a great many foolish, unreasonable and even
absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk."
(emphasis in original). 331 F.2d at 1017.
12. In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983).
13. Id.
14. See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1, 10 (1975) and authorities cited therein.
15. Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
860, 867 (1965).
16. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (extent of
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The protection of innocent third parties, especially children,
presents a stronger case for a finding of a compelling state interest.
This was one reason relied on by the court in In re President and
Directors of Georgetown College1 7 when it ordered a transfusion for
the 25-year-old mother of a seven-month-old child. The court stated
that
"[t]he state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to aban-
don a child, and so it should not allow this most ultimate of
voluntary abandonments. The patient had a responsibility to the
community to care for her infant. Thus, the people had an inter-
est in preserving the life of this mother." 8
This reasoning is highly questionable, especially when the pa-
tient refusing treatment has a spouse who is in full accord with the
patient's decision and is willing and able to provide for the child
alone. In Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 9 the court
expressly recognized the loss of love and upbringing that the pa-
tient's children would suffer if she were to die. The court further
recognized, however, that
they will not be abandoned; they will be reared by a loving reli-
gious family; and they will no doubt cherish the memory of a
courageous mother who in time of peril stood by her religious
convictions. Indeed, that is a legacy which many living mothers
would give anything to leave their children. The parens patriae
doctrine invoked herein cannot, we think, measure increments of
love; it cannot mandate a two-parent, rather than a one-parent
family; it is solely concerned with seeing to it that minor chil-
dren are cared for and are not abandoned.
20
An additional argument against the state's interest in preserving
bodily invasion involved in amputation of both gangrenous legs above the knee was sufficient to
make state's interest in preservation of life give way to 72 year old patient's right of privacy to
decide his own future by declining operation).
17. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g den. en banc, 331 F.2d 1010, cert denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964).
18. 331 F.2d at 1008.
19. 500 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
20. Id. at 688. See also St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsy, 465 So.2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (27-year-old Jehovah's Witness refused transfusion; he was obligated to pay $50 a week
for support of child living with former wife in Michigan; court refused to order transfusion on
the grounds that: (1) he seldom saw the child; (2) mother and both families would help sup-
port the child; (3) child was beneficiary of a small annuity he owned); Mercy Hosp. v. Jack-
son, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985) (Jehovah's Witness went into premature labor;
the physicians recommended a Caesarean but the patient refused a blood transfusion; without
the blood transfusion, while there was no danger to unborn child, the mother could die; the
court upheld the patient's right to refuse the transfusion. She apparently also had at least one
older child.).
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED DECISIONS
a life for the benefit of third persons is the concern that if treatment
can be ordered for some persons because of their particular circum-
stances, it must be ordered for all. This has been recognized by one
commentator who notes that "[a]ny distinction based on 'social
worth' in this area is repugnant to the basic idea of equality; if the
mother of several children is to be saved, then so must the childless
individual." 1
The third category of a compelling state interest that may over-
ride the interests of the individual is the prevention of suicide. Gen-
erally, suicide is regarded with disfavor in Anglo-American law and
society. Under the English common law, a suicide forfeited his prop-
erty to the Crown and his body was buried at a public crossroads
with a wooden stake driven through the heart." Today in the United
States, suicide is not a crime and is not punishable, although in some
jurisdictions attempted suicide is still a criminal act.
Refusal to submit to treatment deemed medically necessary is
sometimes compared to suicide, 3 although the two are conceptually
quite different for several reasons. First, suicide involves an act or
malfeasance, while the failure to submit to treatment involves mere
nonfeasance. Second, the suicide actually desires to die, whereas the
person refusing treatment on religious, privacy, or other grounds has
no wish to die," but merely prefers to follow a course of action that
may be fatal. In fact, he or she may sincerely believe that a "mira-
cle" will intervene to save his or her life.23 Though the consequence
21. Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
860, 872 (1965). An interesting example of the extent to which this alleged state interest can
be asserted is found in In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1985). In that case, a Jehovah's
Witness who was shot by her daughter refused a blood transfusion. The state then sought a
court order, saying that she was needed as an eyewitness against her daughter in that case and
in a case concerning the poisoning of her husband (the girl's father). The trial court authorized
the transfusion and surgery was done. Later, additional surgery was needed. The Mississippi
Supreme Court vacated the order authorizing the transfusion. Surgery was then successfully
performed without a transfusion. The latter court stated that the danger to society of one
murderer escaping did not outweigh the patient's interest in religious freedom and privacy.
22. Silving, Euthanasia, A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
350, 370 (1954).
23. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
24. "The Gordian knot of this suicide question may be cut by the simple fact that Mrs.
Jones did not want to die." In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000, 1009, reh'g denied en banc, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964). "'in suicide there is a conscious purpose to bring about death .... " Comment, The
Right to Die - A Comment on the Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 9 UTAH L. REV. 161, 166 (1964).
25. Christian Scientists believe that their expectation that healing will occur through
prayer is just as reasonable as the expectation of others that healing will occur through medi-
cal treatment.
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may be the same, death, this does not seem to constitute suicide,26
especially in a society that freely allows people to smoke tobacco
with full knowledge of possible lung or coronary damage, or to drink
when they are already suffering from cirrhosis of the liver.
Maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession is
perhaps the least persuasive of the four state interests asserted to
compel an individual to submit to unwanted medical treatment. The
court's reasoning in United States v. George" provides a typical ex-
ample of the way in which this interest is asserted:
The doctor's conscience and professional oath must also be
respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submitted
himself to and insisted upon medical care. Simultaneously he
sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of treatment
amounting to medical malpractice. To require these doctors to
ignore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the name
of free religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circum-
stances. The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he
may not demand mistreatment. 8
There is certainly nothing in professional ethics or simple logic
that requires congruence between a physician's conscience and his
patient's choice of treatment. The principle of informed consent
would be rendered meaningless if the patient's choice were sub-
servient to the physician's judgment, no matter how professionally
sound such judgment may be. The doctor remains free to refuse to
further treat the patient in the event of a conflict of views.29
26. Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962) (doctor said patient
needed operation and transfusion; patient refused transfusion, but was willing to have opera-
tion; hospital said this was equivalent to taking his own life; court disagreed, saying medical
decision is always a question of judgment, and patient has final say).
27. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
28. Id. at 754. See also Crouse Irving Mem. Hosp. v. Paddock, 127 Misc.2d 101, 104,
485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (1985) ("when a patient puts her doctor in charge of a surgical proce-
dure, she necessarily makes him responsible for the conduct of the operation. Every such grant
of responsibility should be accompanied by authority sufficient to properly carry out the dele-
gated responsibilities."); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc.2d 622, 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (1964)
(court said that since patient sought medical attention, he placed legal responsibility for his
care on the hospital).
29. In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033, 1041 (Miss. 1985) ("An individual has the right to
seek treatment from a physician, surgeon or a hospital and specify such conditions as he or she
may desire - [medication, anesthetics, transfusions, etc.]. The physician, surgeon and hospi-
tal, when presented with such conditions, obviously have the right to decline treatment if in
their opinion the conditions are unreasonable or otherwise unacceptable.").
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED DECISIONS
B. Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds
Most cases"0 in which an adult has refused medical treatment
on religious grounds involve Jehovah's Witnesses who have refused
blood transfusions.3" The same constitutional principles apply in the
cases of treatment refusals by Christian Scientists 2 or others who
believe in healing by the power of God and faith alone. In most cases
the courts have refused to order treatment, accepting the argument
that the state's interest did not outweigh the individual's interest in
the free exercise of religion.33 These courts take the position that in
order to justify any infringement upon constitutionally protected reli-
gious liberty, there must be a showing of "grave abuses" endanger-
ing "paramount state interests. ' 4
At least two courts, however, have ordered medical treatment
despite the strong and clearly manifested religious objections of the
30. Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); In re Brown,
478 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); In re Melideo, 88 Misc.2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. III. 1972); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971);
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 598 (1968); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Med. Center, 49 Misc.2d 215, 267
N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); In re
Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re President and Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. de-
nied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
31. Jehovah's Witnesses, while not objecting to medical treatment generally, believe that
blood transfusions violate biblical injunctions against "eating blood." The biblical sources of
these injunctions are Acts 15:28-29, Deuteronomy 12:33, Genesis 9:3-4, and Leviticus 17:10-
14. Many Jehovah's Witnesses would rather die than receive a transfusion. They consider it to
be "a serious violation of the law of God for which transgressors will be called upon by God to
account for and be punished for their sins." Note, An Adult's Right to Resist Blood Transfu-
sions: A View through John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 47 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 571, 571 (1972).
Many people, including Jehovah's Witnesses, object to blood transfusions on nonreligious
grounds also. E.g., the risk of communicable disease, alternative means of treatment, etc. Jeho-
vah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 503 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 598 (1968).
32. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So,2d 679 (Fla. App. 1987); St.
Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666 (Fla. App. 1985); In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033
(Miss. 1985) (surgery was then performed successfully without transfusion); In re Melideo, 88
Misc.2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972) (by
the time the written opinion was filed in this case, the patient had recovered without a transfu-
sion and had left the hospital); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
See also Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (action for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; over objections of Christian Scientist, the patient was given medication at Bellevue Hos-
pital. The court found no compelling reason to give medication without consent); Holmes v.
Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (also a § 1983 case; motion to dismiss
denied).
34. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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patient.35 In two other cases, the courts justified their orders compel-
ling medical treatment on different grounds. In United States v.
George" the court reasoned that while the patient had indicated he
would not agree to a transfusion, he would not resist a court order
permitting it, and his conscience would remain clear. Speaking about
the patient, the court in Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical
Center" stated that "she did not object to receiving the treatment
involved - she would not, however, direct its use." To the extent
that these decisions rely on the patient's lack of spiritual culpability
as a valid basis for compelling the treatment, they are open to seri-
ous question. To interpret the nonviolence of a Jehovah's Witness as
acquiescence seems wrong. Jehovah's Witnesses do object to the
transfusion, but will not resist physically.38
In both Powell and George, the courts justified their reasoning
on the basis that the religious convictions of the patients were not
actually overruled. There was even less justification for the court's
reasoning in the previous two cases. In John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital v. Heston,3 9 the court said that the hospital had an interest
in providing care for a patient involuntarily thrust upon it in an
emergency, and that the state also had an interest in preserving life,
and these circumstances outweighed the interest of the patient. Simi-
larly in In re President and Directors of Georgetown College,40 the
court justified its order permitting a transfusion because the patient
was the mother of a seven-month-old child whom she could not be
allowed to abandon. Moreover, the mother was so far in extremis
that "she was as little able competently to decide for herself as any
child would be." '41 The most disturbing aspect of this opinion is that
the court took it upon itself to decide that "her religion merely pre-
vented her consent to a transfusion. If the law undertook the respon-
sibility of authorizing the transfusion without her consent, no prob-
lem would be raised with respect to her religious practice." '42 The
35. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
reh'd denied en banc, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy
Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
36. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
37. 49 Misc.2d 215, 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451-52 (1965) ("This woman wanted to
live. I could not let her die!").
38. See 239 F. Supp. at 753.
39. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
40. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964).
41. Id. at 1008. Despite this statement about her competency, the court indicated earlier
in its opinion that she had stated her religious objections clearly enough.
42. Id. at 1009.
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED DECISIONS
court's view on this point is contrary to the religious beliefs of most
Jehovah's Witnesses. As previously indicated in this article, the au-
thor does not find these arguments persuasive.
The following assertion is typical of the justifications advanced
in favor of court-compelled medical treatment:
To deny the individual a legally enforceable right to reject
lifesaving treatment for religious reasons does not greatly curtail
his religious freedom . . . . First, no criminal sanctions are im-
posed on him. Second, he is allowed to practice the dictates of
his religion in all but the most limited of circumstances: the life
and death situation. Third, neither he nor his religion, at least in
the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses, will deem him to have
sinned. He did not voluntarily breach religious dictates.4
The fallacy in this approach is that it leaves to the court the
judgment on the relative importance of certain religious beliefs.
Careful examination of the language the courts have used illustrates
this. A Connecticut court has described treatment refusal as an "idi-
osyncras[y] of personal belief.""" A Pennsylvania court has de-
nounced it as a menace and danger to the public health. 46 In addi-
tion, a Mississippi court declared, "When we consider in these
modern times, the remarkable successes from the wonder drugs and
the marvelous feats of surgery, it is almost unbelievable that a ra-
tional human being can be so fanatical in his adherence to creed that
he would deny himself these great means and agencies of relief and
repair, especially if he is suffering with some substantial malady."46
On the other hand, the need to respect an individual's religious
beliefs even if they involve treatment refusals, has been articulated
by more than one court. As Justice Murphy so well stated in his
dissenting opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts:
47
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in
terms of persecution and intolerance as the one dealing with re-
ligious freedom. From ancient times to the present day, the inge-
nuity of man has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons
of oppression for use against those who dare to express or prac-
tice unorthodox religious beliefs . . . . Religious freedom is too
sacred a right to be restricted or prohibited in any degree with-
out convincing proof that a legitimate interest of the state is in
43. Note, supra note 21, at 872-73. As to the third point, see also supra note 37.
44. Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn. 590, 597, 159 A. 575, 578 (1932).
45. In re First Church of Christ, Scientist, 205 Pa. 543, 550-51, 55 A. 536, 539 (1903).
46. Eggleston v. Landrum, 210 Miss. 645, 652, 50 So.2d 364, 367 (1951).
47. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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grave danger."8
Even more directly on point is the clear and forceful statement of
Judge Hamley, dissenting in State v. Armstrong.
49
Those who here find sufficient justification for the frustra-
tion of appellant's deep religious convictions doubtless feel that
her injury will be slight and short-lived. But the issue before us
encompasses far more than the rights of one individual. It is in
such ways as this, if at all, that our basic liberties will be lost.
As a people we will rise quickly to defend our freedom from
brazen dictators, foreign or domestic. Can we, however, with-
stand the insidious erosion produced by a multiplicity of little
instances where, as here, a guaranteed right is set aside because
it interferes with what is said to be good for us?50
These intrusions upon religious freedom are no less reprehensi-
ble merely because they are rare. A patient's refusal of medical
treatment on religious grounds is entitled to the same respect and
protection as that accorded to worshiping in a church and preaching
from a pulpit. 1 Furthermore, neither the truth or falsity, nor the
foolishness or credibility, of a religiously motivated action can be put
to a test.52 As Justice Douglas said, men may believe "theories of life
48. Id. at 175-76 (Murphy, J. dissenting). See also Note, The Right to Die, 18 U. FLA.
L. REV. 591 (1966), which states as follows:
What could be more of a testimony to the dignity and individuality of man
than the right to decide for himself exactly what concepts and beliefs are worth
dying for? The soldiers who marched away on crusades to the Holy Land and
faced almost certain death in search of a Holy Grail would seem to one who had
no concept of the meaning of Christianity to be giving up their lives foolishly.
Should they have not been allowed to go? Should the Christian martyrs who
were faced with the choice either of denying God or facing death in Roman
arenas have been denied the opportunity to choose that faithfulness to their God
was more important and real than life could even be? Each man, no matter what
his beliefs, should be able to make the decision that his beliefs are worth dying
for.
Id. at 604.
49. 39 Wash.2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
50. Id. at 873, 239 P.2d at 553 (Hamley, J. dissenting).
51. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
52. See, e.g., Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251 (D.W. Va.
1942), a-f'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which states:
There is hardly a group of religious people to be found in the world who do
not hold to beliefs and regard practices as important which seem utterly foolish
and lacking in reason to others equally wise and religious; and for the courts to
attempt to distinguish between religious beliefs or practices on the ground that
they are reasonable or unreasonable would be for them to embark upon a hope-
less undertaking and one which would inevitably result in the end of religious
liberty. There is not a religious persecution in history that was not justified in
the eyes of those engaging in it on the ground that it was reasonable and right
and that the persons whose practices were suppressed were guilty of stubborn
folly hurtful to the general welfare.
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and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers
of the orthodox faiths."58 Under our constitutional system, "[t]he
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma
",54
When people have sought to avoid vaccination or tests for com-
municable diseases, the courts have generally held that the "right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the commu-
nity . . . to communicable disease . . . ., While the state's inter-
est in protecting the public health would seem to be compelling, it
appears that, in some instances, the state is motivated at least partly,
and perhaps totally, by the desire to protect the person to be vacci-
nated or otherwise treated." If the person involved is an adult, such
forced treatment is objectionable for all the reasons advanced in the
previous discussion. Additionally, refusal of vaccination is really of
no concern to others since non-objectors are themselves immunized
and thus protected.
When the person involved is a minor, different issues are
presented, which will be discussed at length later in this article.5"
Some states require that, prior to entry into school, children must be
immunized against measles and polio,58 but allow an exemption for
those children whose parents claim that immunization is contrary to
their religious beliefs.59 Although well intended, these, exemptions
make very little sense. If immunization is a vital public health mea-
sure, the state interest is compelling and there should be no excep-
tions. Furthermore, if the state interest is not so compelling that it
can yield to sincerely held religious beliefs, perhaps it must also yield
to any sincere objection." So limiting objections to only religious
reasons seems to violate the establishment clause of the first amend-
Id. at 253.
53. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
54. Id. (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871)).
55. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). See also Kleid v. Board of
Educ., 406 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Ky. 1976); McCartney v. Austin, 31 App. Div. 2d 370, 298
N.Y.S.2d 26 (1969); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist. No. 1, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644
(1965); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); State v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.
2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
56. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School Dist. No. 1, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644
(1965).
57. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 3380 (West Supp. 1975).
59. Id. at § 3385.
60. For example, the religious exception could be "extended" to include other objections
on moral, ethical, or philosophical grounds, as was done to bring some conscientious objectors
within the protection of the draft law exemption on "religious" grounds. See Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Such an approach, however, seems to clearly ignore the legisla-
tive intent.
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ment of the Constitution.6"
C. Refusal of Medical Treatment by a Pregnant Mother
When a pregnant woman refuses medical treatment for reli-
gious reasons, a new aspect of the issue appears. In Mercy Hospital
v. Jackson,62 a Jehovah's Witness who was approximately twenty-six
weeks pregnant went into premature labor. Vaginal delivery would
have been risky for her because of the possibility of rupturing her
uterus. Thus, a Caesarean delivery was recommended. This proce-
dure often requires a transfusion to replace the loss of blood. The
patient consented to the Caesarean, but refused to allow any transfu-
sion. She knew this might result in her own death, but it would not
endanger the unborn child.0 3 The Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals held that a competent pregnant adult may refuse a transfusion
on religious grounds when there is no risk to the unborn child. "
The choice between the mother's religious beliefs and the life of
the unborn child was not an issue in Mercy Hospital v. Jackson.
However, the court in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
Authority65 did decide this question. In Jefferson, medical complica-
tions caused doctors to conclude that vaginal birth would result in a
ninety-nine percent certainty of death for the unborn child and a
fifty percent .chance of death for the mother. A Caesarean delivery
would involve little risk for either. The mother, however, refused the
Caesarean and any blood transfusions because of her religious
convictions.
The court, after noting that it would be a criminal offense in
Georgia to abort the child and that a viable unborn child is protected
by the United States Constitution, authorized the hospital to admin-
61. Two courts disagree with the author's view on this point. The establishment clause
argument was rejected in Kleid v. Board of Educ., 406 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Ky. 1976), in
which the court stated that the benefit to any religious group is, at most, only incidental,
indirect, and remote. Id. at 905. In McCartney v. Austin, 31 App. Div. 2d 370, 298 N.Y.S.2d
26 (1969), the court did not reach the establishment clause issue because it held that even if
the statutory exemption for religious objectors was invalid, it would be separable from the
remainder of the statute (under a saving clause in the statute), and therefore the state could
still require vaccination of the children of the objectors. Id. at 371, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
In both of the cases, however, the court clearly felt that the state had a compelling inter-
est for requiring immunization.
62. 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985).
63. Id. at 412 n.2, 489 A.2d at 1131.
64. Id. at 418, 489 A.2d at 1134. Previously, the trial court had denied the hospital's
application for appointment of a guardian to consent to the transfusion. The Caesarean was
done without any transfusions, and both mother and child survived. Despite the apparent
mootness, the appellate court did not dismiss because the issue would surely arise again and
would probably always be moot by the time it reached the appellate level.
65. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
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ister any "medical procedures deemed necessary by the attending
physician to preserve the life of [the] unborn child." 6 The court
found the intrusion upon the mother's beliefs "outweighed by the
duty of the state to protect a living, unborn human being.""7
Two other courts have agreed that the state's interest in protect-
ing an unborn child outweighs a mother's interest in the free exercise
of her religion. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital
v. Anderson," a thirty-two weeks pregnant Jehovah's Witness told
the hospital she would not accept transfusions. It appeared, however,
that she might hemorrhage severely before birth, and that she and
the unborn child would die unless a transfusion was administered. 9
The court held that it must act to save the unborn child and required
the mother to receive the transfusion.
Similarly, in In re Jamaica Hospital,"° an eighteen-weeks preg-
nant Jehovah's Witness refused a transfusion needed to treat her in-
ternal bleeding and to save the life of her unborn child. The court
held that "the state had a highly significant interest in protecting the
life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs the patient's right to refuse
a blood transfusion on religious grounds. '7 1 The court's reasoning
was inconsistent. Despite its statement that the state's interest is less
than compelling in an abortion context because the fetus is not yet
viable, the court still found a "highly significant [state] interest" in
preserving the lives of the nonviable fetus and its mother. It would
seem that if a pregnant woman can legally abort a nonviable fetus
without giving any reason, a treatment refusal based on sincere reli-
gious beliefs should be allowed even though it might result in the
abortion of a nonviable fetus.
While there are separate beliefs regarding the abortion issue
generally, for purposes of this article the relationship between a
pregnant woman and her unborn child is no different from the rela-
tionship between a mother and her living child. The parent-child sit-
uation will be discussed later in this article."
66. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
67. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
68. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
69. The trial court denied the hospital's petition and, before the appeal could be heard,
she left the hospital. The appellate court decided the case anyway because the issue would
arise again. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
70. 128 Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985).
71. Id. at 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
72. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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D. Denial of a Benefit Because of Refusal of Medical Treatment
on Religious Grounds
Whether the state may rely on a person's medical treatment re-
fusal based on religious grounds to deny benefits to which the person
would be entitled otherwise, is an unresolved question. Applying the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner,"' the answer
should be "no." In Sherbert, the employer, a textile mill, discharged
a Seventh Day Adventist who was unwilling to work on Saturday.
She could not obtain employment at other mills for the same reason.
Because she would not accept "suitable work" when offered, the
state denied unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme
Court held that this denial of unemployment compensation placed an
unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion and re-
sulted, in effect, in a fine for observing the Sabbath on Saturday. 4
Prior to Sherbert, a California appellate court upheld 75 a deci-
sion by the Industrial Accident Commission denying workers' com-
pensation to the widow and children of a deceased Jehovah's Wit-
ness. The decedent ruptured his spleen at work when a scaffold
collapsed. Since he refused a blood transfusion, the operation was
performed with only plasma and other substitutes for whole blood.
Apparently, there was little question that he would have lived and
fully recovered if transfusions had been given during surgery.76 The
Industrial Accident Commission denied compensation to his widow
because his death was caused by his "unreasonable refusal to accept
proper medical treatment, and his death was not the proximate re-
sult of [his] injury."'7 The court rejected the claimants' contention
that the Commission could not find decedent's refusal of treatment
"unreasonable" without also finding that his religious beliefs were
unreasonable; a finding that the court had no authority to determine.
Yet the applicable statute required a finding that the refusal was
unreasonable. It is unclear how that refusal could be deemed unrea-
sonable unless the belief which prompted it was also found to be
73. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
74. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state cannot deny unemploy-
ment compensation to Jehovah's Witness who, for religious reasons, quit his job when trans-
ferred to department manufacturing military tank turrets).
75. Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal. App. 2d 137, 304 P.2d 828 (1956),
questioned in Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181
(1973).
76. Id. at 139, 304 P.2d at 829.
77. Id. The statute provided that no compensation would be paid if death was caused by
an unreasonable refusal to submit to medical treatment.
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unreasonable."8
After Sherbert, in 1972, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the
state's denial of disability benefits because the applicant for benefits
refused, on religious grounds, to submit to a medical examination. 9
The court cited Sherbert in support of its statement that "a state in
providing services for its people may provide them on a condition
which is contrary to the religious scruples of some; but the condition
imposed must be reasonable and must be justified by some compel-
ling state interest." 80 The court went on to find that the state had a
compelling interest in ensuring that welfare benefits were paid only
to those with a real disability and that a medical examination was a
reasonable way to make this determination.8
The Kansas court in Powers reasoned that the applicant was not
required to have a medical examination, but that, if she refused, she
would be denied benefits. Although the court purported to be guided
by Sherbert, it is difficult to reconcile the different results in Powers
and Sherbert. Surely the state has alternative methods to verify that
applicants are disabled; therefore the state's interest in examining
every welfare disability applicant is not compelling. Nor does the
likelihood of fraudulent claims based on religious objections seem to
pose a serious problem. The result in Powers places a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion without adequate justification.
A later appellate court case from California contains clearer
and more persuasive reasoning. In Montgomery v. Board of Retire-
ment,8" a county employee had been denied disability retirement
benefits because she refused, on religious grounds,83 an operation to
remove a uterine tumor. The surgery involved little risk and would
have resulted in full recovery.84 Without surgery the possibility of
death increased greatly. The retirement board denied benefits and
found that the employee was not permanently disabled because her
condition could be surgically corrected. The appellate court reversed
the decision of the retirement board and stated that "the principles
78. Id. at 140-41, 304 P.2d at 829-30.
79. Powers v. State Dept. of Social Welfare, 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d 590 (1972).
80. Id. at 614, 493 P.2d at 598. The court explained that "[tihe individual cannot be
permitted on religious grounds to be the sole judge of his duty to obey laws enacted in the
public interest." Id. at 614, 493 P.2d at 597-98.
81. Id.
82. 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973).
83. She belonged to the Church of God (Evening Light Saints), which believes in divine
healing and opposes internal surgery.
84. After surgery, the patient was expected to be in the hospital for two weeks, followed
by a month's convalescence at home, then back to work.
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set forth in Martin . . . no longer represent the law in this field."8
The court believed that Sherbert was "dispositive" because the effect
of the retirement board's ruling was to prevent the employee from
receiving benefits if she adhered to her religious beliefs86 and that
"such a choice places a burden upon the practice of [her] religion. ' 87
Finally, the court found no compelling state interest justifying this
burden on her right to the free exercise of religion.88
III. Refusal of Medical Treatment by a Parent on Behalf of a
Child
A. Is this Child Neglect?
It is fundamental in American society that the custody, care,
and nurturing of children is primarily the responsibility of the par-
ents.89 Additionally, parental autonomy in fulfilling these responsibil-
ities is constitutionally protected. 9 American society tolerates and
even encourages diversity in lifestyles which includes "the right of
parents to raise their children as they think best."' 1
Under the doctrine of parens patriae,92 however, most, if not all
states have limited the autonomy of parents to raise their children as
they wish. It is generally held that "[t]he state's authority over chil-
dren's activities is broader than that over like actions of adults."'"
The protection of human life is one of the most important state
goals. Accordingly, state authorities have taken the position that in-
tervention is justified if parents fail to provide their children with
85. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The court noted that Martin had not
been cited in any subsequent case, and that its ratio decidendi "is inconsistent with and cannot
be reconciled with the rules laid down in" Sherbert and subsequent cases. Id. See supra note
75.
86. Denial of benefits would force her to choose between following her religious beliefs
and forfeiting her disability benefits, on the one hand, and "abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to cease to be permanently disabled and return to work on the other
hand." 33 Cal. App. 3d at 451, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
87. Id.
88. In making this finding the court noted that "the number of employees who fit appel-
lant's mode is [not likely to be] so large as to have other than a minimal impact . 33
Cal. App. 3d at 452, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
89. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). It is ironic that the Court ren-
dered one of its most-quoted expressions of parental rights in a decision which upheld the right
of the state to limit parental child-rearing practices in order to protect the child's interests.
90. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980). See also cases cited therein.
91. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51. Most, if not all states have statutes prohibiting
medical treatment of minors without parental consent, except in emergencies.
92. Parens patriae refers to the power of the state as sovereign to protect people who are
under a disability, such as children. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
93. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944); see also Wright v. DeWitt
School Dist. No. 1, 238 Ark. 906, 910, 385 S.W.2d 644, 647 (1965).
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necessary medical care or treatment.94
Parents may refuse medical care on behalf of their children for
many reasons. In some instances, the recommended treatment con-
travenes the parents' religious convictions. In others, treatment is in-
consistent with their beliefs regarding effective healing; that is, they
believe that a different form of treatment would be more effective.
For still other parents, treatment is seen as the infliction of pain ab-
sent any hope of recovery.
Most jurisdictions have enacted child neglect statutes to address
the circumstance in which parents fail to provide "necessary" medi-
cal care for their children. 95 These statutes authorize both removal
of the children from the parents' custody96 and imposition of crimi-
nal liability.97 Many statutes allow courts to appoint a guardian to
consent to medical treatment for the child involved. Even in the ab-
sence of such statutes, courts have been willing to authorize or order
medical treatment against the express refusal of the parents.98
In decisions involving medical treatment for a child, as in all
child-related decisions, the paramount factor is always the best inter-
est of the child. Because parents will ordinarily act in their children's
94. See 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979) ("the power of the
parent . . . may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopard-
ize the health or safety of the child."). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34
(1972).
95. The standard for determining if medical care is necessary is whether an ordinary,
prudent person would deem it necessary to seek medical services. People v. Edwards, 42
Misc.2d 930, 249 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1964).
Courts have had to construe how far medical neglect statutes were intended to reach.
They have usually held that when a child's life is in imminent danger, medical care is neces-
sary. Parental refusal, therefore, (regardless of the reasons) constitutes neglect and authorizes
state intervention. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488
(W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
In contrast, where the child's life is not threatened, courts have been more divided about
whether the care is necessary and whether or not to allow the state to intercede. See, e.g., In re
Sampson, 65 Misc.2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), affd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(1971), aft'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (court ordered medi-
cal treatment even though child's condition was not life-threatening). But see, e.g., In re
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 282 A.2d 387 (1972) (court refused to order medical treatment).
96. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-9 (West 1976).
97. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1984).
98. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), reh'g and redetermi-
nation, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (custody taken from parents so child could
receive chemotherapy treatment for leukemia); In re Cicero, 101 Misc.2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d
965 (1979) (court appointed guardian to arrange for operation on child with spinal bifida); In
re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941) (court authorized operation to correct
deformity in child's foot; father had opposed operation, but mother favored it); In re Vasko,
238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (court authorized operation to remove malignant
growth in child's eye). But see In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979)
in which the court refused to require, against the parents' wishes, repair of a heart defect in a
child with Down's syndrome.
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best interests, courts quite properly accord great deference to paren-
tal decisions. Considering the strong presumption against coercive
state intervention and in favor of parental autonomy and family pri-
vacy, it is difficult to justify state-mandated medical treatment for a
child. This becomes particularly apparent when considering that the
state does not punish or remove custody from parents who allow
their children to jeopardize their health by other means such as
smoking or over-eating.
Complete recovery often depends upon post-treatment therapy
and psychological support. While a court may order surgery over a
parent's objection, it cannot force a family to provide necessary post-
treatment therapy or moral encouragement."'
B. Refusal on Religious Grounds
People who refuse medical treatment on religious grounds often
assert that not only do they have a constitutional right to do so, but
also that there is no proof that nonmedical methods are less success-
ful than medical treatment. For example, in its amicus brief to the
California Supreme Court in Walker v. Superior Court,100 the
Church of Christ, Scientist cited "a letter to the Mother Church1"'
[from] Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, which ha[d]
provided life insurance on employees at the church headquarters,
point[ing] out that the loss rate among Christian Scientists is very
favorable ('approximately 6.2% better than our "average
group" ,).",012 When the state overrides religious objections and or-
ders medical treatment or punishes parents for neglect, it is essen-
tially saying that medical treatment is more effective than spiritual
means. Yet the state is never required to present evidence that con-
ventional medical care is always the most effective treatment. As in-
dicated above, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. 03 In
particular, Christian Scientists point to the fact that many thousands
of people have relied on nonmedical spiritual healing for several gen-
99. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
100. S.F. 24996 (Cal. 1987).
101. The First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, is commonly referred to as the
"Mother Church."
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae Church of Christ, Scientist at 7, Walker v. Superior Court,
S.F. 24996 (Cal. 1987).
103. "Christian Science practice is usually judged by its failures, whereas medicine is
more often judged by its successes." Talbot, Christian Science and the Care of Children. The
Position of the Christian Science Church, 309 THE NEw ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE
1641-44 (Dec. 29, 1983), cited in Brief of Amicus Curiae Church of Christ Scientist, at 6,
Walker v. Superior Court, S.F. 24996 (Cal. 1987).
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erations; as intelligent people and loving parents, they would not con-
tinue to do so if this method was ineffective.104
Despite the constitutional and pragmatic reasons asserted for
nonintervention, the states almost uniformly have been willing to au-
thorize or compel medical treatment for children of objecting par-
ents '05 and to punish parents who fail to provide medical treatment
for their children.' 0 Only when the situation is not life-threatening
have some courts held that the state's interest did not outweigh the
parents' right to religious freedom.10 7  Some courts have ordered
treatment even in these situations.'0 "
The attitude of the courts is exemplified well by a statement in
Eggleston v. Landrum:' "[An enlightened society will not permit
the great healing medium of modern medicine and surgery to be de-
104. Statement on Legal Issues and Christian Science Child Care, The First Church of
Christ Scientist, Boston, Mass. (Jan. 14, 1987).
105. In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. I, 633 P.2d 1302, review denied, 291 Or. 662, 639 P.2d
1280 (1981); In re Ivey, 319 So.2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d
147 (Iowa 1972); In re Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc.2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1965); Cude v.
State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 190 A.2d
621 (1963); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962);
In re Santos, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450, appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 642, 185
N.E.2d 551, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1962); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Ops. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128
(1962); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252
S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
106. Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa.
Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962); Beck v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 P. 495 (1925); Owens v. State, 6
Okla. Crim. I 10, 116 P. 345 (1911); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903);
Rex v. Lewis, 6 Ont. L. 132, I B.R.C. 732 (1903); Regina v. Senior, I Q.B. 283, 19 Cox C.C.
219 (C.C.R. 1899). See also Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (court said
religious belief is not a defense, but ordinary negligence will not sustain manslaughter convic-
tion, and any gross negligence by parent was after it was too late to save child, so not proxi-
mate cause of death); State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904) (court reluctantly
affirmed judgment for defendant because state's bill of exceptions not timely filed; court
clearly indicated that, on the merits, religious belief is not a justification for committing an act
which constitutes a criminal offense).
107. People ex rel. D.L.E., 200 Colo. 244, 614 P.2d 873 (1980) (order declaring child
"dependent" reversed); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, -. , 127 N.E.2d 820, 824 (1955) (a 4-3
decision, in which the dissent urged that the child was "quite plainly a victim of [his father's]
unfortunate delusions."). In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), appeal after re-
mand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
108. Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974) (Jeho-
vah's Witness parents refused transfusions for six-day-old child with jaundice. This condition
would not cause death, but would cause brain damage. The court authorized the transfusion,
but the child died anyway of other causes); In re Gregory S., 85 Misc.2d 846, 380 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1976) (intervention is proper if it will have beneficial effect, even if no emergency); In re
Sampson, 65 Misc.2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686,
278 N.E.2d 918 (1972) (court authorized surgery and blood transfusion to correct deformity
of face and neck, even though doctors admitted that surgery was risky and would not be com-
plete cure.) Query: Would the result in Sampson have been different if the parents had refused
to allow surgery because they deemed it too risky?
109. 210 Miss. 645, 50 So.2d 364 (1951).
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nied to children, regardless of the conscientious belief of their par-
ents ..... 11o These courts recognize that the power of the state "to
reach into a home and snatch a child from its mother" should be
exercised "with extreme care.""" But, while parents may often de-
prive their children of liberty or property, " 2 they are not permitted
to deprive their children of life or physical health.113 Although the
child may "belong" to his parents, the state has a duty to protect the
child's "right to live and grow up with a sound mind in a sound
body."
' 1 4
Theoretically, a distinction can be drawn between those cases in
which a parent is criminally prosecuted for failure to provide medi-
cal treatment and those in which a court orders or authorizes medi-
cal treatment. Imposing criminal liability on parents has the effect of
compelling them to consult doctors for treatment of their children.
Thus, they must affirmatively perform an act which is contrary to
their religious beliefs. When a court orders medical treatment for
children, no affirmative action is required of the parents. " 5 This the-
oretical distinction, however, is one without any practical difference.
In both scenarios, the parents' right to freely exercise their religion,
including the right to determine the religious beliefs and practices of
their children, is violated by state intervention.
Many state statutes protecting children from parental neglect
and abuse contain express provisions granting parents the right to
utilize spiritual treatment. Most of these statutes expressly exclude
the provision of such care as a basis for a finding of "neglect" or
110. Id. at 653, 50 So.2d at 367. See also Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947). The Mitchell court states:
It is well settled that "opposition to medical treatment because of religious
belief does not constitute a defense to a prosecution for breach of statutory duty
to furnish a child with such treatment. Conscientious obedience to what the indi-
vidual may consider a higher power or authority must yield to the law of the
land where duties of this character are involved, and since a wicked intent is not
an essential element of the crime, peculiarities of belief as to the proper form of
treatment, however honestly entertained, are not necessarily a lawful excuse."
Id. (quoting 39 Am. Jur. § 115, at 781).
111. In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 148, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (1955).
112. In re Clark, 21 Ohio Ops.2d 86, 89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1962) (consent to mar-
riage of minor; choice of religious faith; domicile; work, recreation, clothing); In re Jensen, 54
Or. App. 1, 7, 633 P.2d 1302, 1306 (1981) ("Presumably, no court would prohibit a parent
from compelling a recalcitrant six-year-old to attend Sunday School .... ").
113. In re Clark, 21 Ohio Ops.2d 86, 89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1962).
114. Id. at 90, 185 N.E.2d at 132. See also In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 7, 633 P.2d
1302, 1306 (1981).("presumably no court would hesitate to enjoin the sacrifice of a child to a
volcano god").
115. Presumably, however, the parents do have to pay for the compelled medical treat-
ment. This is not discussed in any of the cases. Many Christian Scientists do not carry medical
insurance.
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"abuse." 116 However, this broad grant of authority to parents al-
lowing them to employ spiritual forms of treatment has been drasti-
cally narrowed by judicial interpretation in some jurisdictions. For
example, in Walker v. Superior Court"" the California Court of Ap-
peals denied a writ of prohibition to a mother who sought to bar
prosecution for manslaughter. She claimed that the statutory provi-
sion permitting a parent to provide a child with spiritual treatment
in lieu of medical care was a complete defense to prosecution. The
court, however, disagreed. It construed the statute as permitting a
parent to substitute prayer treatment for "other remedial care," but
not for "medical attendance.""' 8 This statutory construction led the
court to conclude that "a child receiving treatment by spiritual
means in lieu of medical care shall not for that reason alone be con-
sidered a neglected child"; however, "the child may be deemed ne-
glected . . . if the omission of medical care would result in serious
harm.""' 9 As a practical matter, such a construction of the statute
eliminates most of the protection for parents objecting to treatment
on religious grounds.120
Even when statutes do protect parents from criminal prosecu-
tion, they often do not preclude a court from ordering that medical
treatment be provided.' Only in those states whose statutes extend
116. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 16509.1, 18950.5 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1980).
Many of the statutes specify as a qualification for exemption that the person seeking
exemption must be a member of a "well-recognized church or denomination," See, e.g., CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4508 (West 1974). This may narrow the scope of the exemption sub-
stantially, especially when one recalls that Jesus and Mohammed were heretics in their day,
and that Paul and the early Christians did not comprise a "well-recognized church or
denomination."
117. 176 Cal. App. 3d 526, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87, 715 P.2d 260 (1986).
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987) provides:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to fur-
nish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial
care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor . ...
If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through
prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church
or religious denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treat-
ment shall constitute "other remedial care," as used in this section.
119. 176 Cal. App. 3d at - 222 Cal. Rptr. at 92, 715 P.2d at _. (Cal. App. 3d
and P.2d opinions omitted pending review).
120. At the time this article was written, the Walker case was still pending in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.
121. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-722 (1981), which provides:
A parent or guardian legitimately practicing religious beliefs who does not pro-
vide specified medical treatment for a child because of such religious beliefs
shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian; however, this section
shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical service be provided to the
child when the child's health so requires . . ..
Id.
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much further to provide that state authorities may not compel a
child to undergo medical treatment if his parents object on religious
grounds,1 22 do objecting parents have total protection to freely exer-
cise their own religious beliefs and to fully control the religious
training of their children.
There are strong reasons supporting the position that the state
should not require medical treatment for a child over the religious
objections of his parents. The harm resulting from state-mandated
treatment is well-illustrated by the circumstance in which a blood
transfusion or other medical treatment is given to a child and the
child dies anyway."' 3 According to the parents' religious beliefs
(which also apply to the child if he is old enough to understand and
share them), in this event, the child is denied a spiritual life hereaf-
ter and will suffer eternal damnation.1 24 This represents an exercise
of state power with no gain, at terrible cost.
Even if the treatment is medically successful, both the child's
and the parents' later lives may be adversely affected by the knowl-
edge that the child's life was saved in an immoral way by a sinful
act. For the remainder of their physical lives on earth, both the par-
ents and the child will have to face a future of spiritual damnation
and alienation from their God.125
Although courts often state that the state's action in these cases
affects only the child's health and not his religious beliefs,"2 6 this
proposition simply is not true. Either at the time of the treatment, if
122. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4C-6 (1981), which states as follows:
The provisions of this act shall not be construed to deny treatment by spiri-
tual means or prayer, of any child, in accordance with the religious faith of the
parent or parents of such child. The provisions of this act shall not be construed
to authorize or empower the Bureau of Childrens (sic) Services to compel a
child to undergo medical or surgical treatment, if the child, or parent or guard-
ian of said child, objects thereto in a signed statement upon the ground that the
proposed action interferes with the free exercise of his religious principles.
123. See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518
(1974) (Jehovah's Witness parents refused transfusions for six-day-old child with jaundice.
The court ordered the transfusion, but the child died anyway of other causes.); State v. Per-
ricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (the court authorized
administration of blood to a "blue baby" whose congenital heart defect caused oxygen defi-
ciency that threatened the infant with death or irreversible brain damage. The transfusion was
not expected to cure the heart defect, but was considered by the court to be justified by the
critical condition of the baby and by the medical consensus as to the likelihood of the success
and negligible risk of procedure. Despite the transfusion, the child did not survive.).
124. The potential for spiritual damnation is the belief of only some of those who reject
medical treatment on religious grounds. Others, such as Christian Scientists, disagree.
125. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnhard, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985).
See also Chicago Tribune, Aug. 19, 1984, § 2, col. 6.
126. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 352, 292 A.2d 387, 394 (1972) (Eagen, J.,
dissenting).
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the child is old enough, or later, in any event, the child will realize
that the state deemed his parents' belief to be "wrong" - so wrong
that the state had to act to "save" the child. There could hardly be a
more devastating interference with the religious training of the child.
This effect upon the child's religious beliefs raises the strongest
objection to state-imposed medical treatment. When a state over-
rides a religious objection and orders medical treatment, the state is
saying that physical life on earth is more valuable than spiritual life
thereafter. While many people surely adhere to that belief, or see no
conflict between the two, others disagree. 2 7 One need only think of
those who died in wars to keep the world safe for democracy, the
early Christian martyrs and later Crusaders, or others who have died
for causes they valued highly, to recognize that there are many peo-
ple who are willing to sacrifice physical life for some "higher value."
When the state decides which, if any, values may be allowed to pre-
vail over the continuation of physical life on earth, it is establishing
those values as "true" and "correct." This is precisely what the first
amendment says the state cannot do - "establish" any belief as to
religious matters.12 8
History is replete with examples of yesterday's heresy becoming
tomorrow's orthodoxy. Religious freedom "embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths." 12 9
It was not so long ago that a state attempted to force Amish
parents to send their children to high school. The state urged that it
had a compelling interest in assuring the education of these children
so they would be prepared to live in the broader community. The
Supreme Court, however, recognized the right of the parents to train
their children as they saw fit, since state interference would have a
profound effect on the children's future religious lives.130 This princi-
ple seems clearly applicable to medical treatment cases. For many
people, there is no part of life more important than religious belief
and practice. What can be more important to those people than the
right to pass those beliefs on to their children and to teach them the
"right" way to live? Would any early Christian have urged his child
127. See, e.g., Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 621, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952) ("'We feel that we would be . . . destroying the baby's life for the
future, not only this life . . . but also the baby's chances for future life. We feel it is more
important than this life.' " The opinion quoted the testimony of child's mother).
128. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
129. U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
130. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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to renounce his faith and thereby save himself from the lions?
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"'3 the Supreme Court recognized that
the strength of American society depends on the willingness of its
members to allow diversity of religious belief. If parents can be al-
lowed to deny their children the opportunity for formal secondary
education, why cannot they be allowed to decide the relative value of
life on earth and life hereafter?
IV. Parental Refusal of Treatment Based on Advice of Religious
Advisor
A. Criminal Liability of the Religious Advisor
Most states, if not all, do not subject clergy to government regu-
lation or licensing. To do so would require that the state establish
criteria of eligibility. This would necessitate the state's involvement
in theological matters clearly forbidden by the first amendment.
Most states have expressly exempted the clergy from state regula-
tion, particularly as to "any kind of treatment by prayer,"1"2 or the
"provision of services when done by the tenets of any well-recognized
church." 13
Although parents have been held criminally liable for withhold-
ing medical treatment from their children on religious grounds,134
members of the clergy who encourage or abet them are not subject
to criminal liability. 3 The religious advisor becomes liable only
when he goes beyond spiritual treatment and includes some form of
medication or physical contact."3 6
Arguably, a clergyman's13 7 recommendation to discontinue or
forego medical advice or treatment is essentially a prescription be-
cause the clergyman directs a course of action that could lead to
serious results and holds himself out as having some expertise on
which the patient or parent may rely. Even if express statutory pro-
tection is not available, the first amendment seems to mandate that a
131. Id.
132. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2063 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 111, §
4474 (West 1985) ("persons treating human ailments by prayer or spiritual means as an exer-
cise or enjoyment of religious freedom").
133. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4508 (West 1974).
134. See supra note 106.
135. State v. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1905); Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo.
App. 204 (1902).
136. People v. Handzik, 410 II1. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927
(1952); People v. Vogelgesang, 221 N.Y. 290, 116 N.E. 977 (1917).
137. To avoid the appearance of being sexist, the author cast about for a sex-neutral
word to use instead of "clergyman." "Clergyperson" sounds hopelessly artificial, and no other
word seems to fit.
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court may not inquire into the truth of any sincerely-held belief.
B. Civil Liability of the Religious Advisor
It appears that an action cannot be brought by a patient, or the
parents of a patient, against a clergyman for negligence or malprac-
tice based on a recommendation to refuse or not seek medical treat-
ment.188 If such an action were allowed, the court would have to pass
judgment on the competence, training, and methods of the clergy-
man. 139 Also, the court would have to find some definable duty which
the clergyman had violated.1 0 Such a duty, however, can only be
defined by the religious group to which the clergyman belongs.1""
V. Conclusion
The very essence of most religious beliefs is the relationship of a
person to a supreme being and the determination of the relative
value of one's physical life on earth and a potential spiritual life
hereafter. The first amendment prohibits the state from prescribing
that physical life on earth is more important than life hereafter.
Every person has the right to make that critical decision. Similarly,
parents have the right to make that decision for their children and to
instill in them the parents' values and beliefs.""
Americans expect prisoners-of-war to die rather than to cooper-
ate with the enemy. The Medal of Honor is given to soldiers who
throw themselves on hand grenades. Christians worship Jesus Christ
because he died rather than renounce his faith. They revere the mar-
tyrs who, along with their children, were fed to the lions in the Ro-
man Coliseum. If people sincerely believe that a higher principle is
more valuable than physical life, society cannot deny them this
138. See, e.g., Brown v. Laitner, No. 73903, slip op. at 12 (Mich. App. Dec. 17, 1986)
("public policy militates against providing a cause of action based on good faith spiritual heal-
ing practices").
139. Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 141 Ill. App. 3d 898, 907-08, 490
N.E.2d 1319, 1324-25, cert. denied, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 317 (1986).
140. Id. at 906, 490 N.E.2d at 1324-25.
141. In this regard, the Court in Baumgartner stated: "As the United States Supreme
Court has held, the first amendment bars the judiciary from considering whether certain reli-
gious conduct conforms to the standards of a particular religious group." Id. at 904, 490
N.E.2d at 1323.
142. This principle of the right of parents to determine what is best for their children,
especially in religious matters, has been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. See Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school attendance up to age 16 held to inter-
fere with Amish parents' right to determine proper upbringing of their children); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon statute requiring all children
to attend public school, despite their parents' preference for parochial schools).
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choice without doing violence to a constitutional protection that is
supposed to be fundamental.14 s
143. "It is, of course, immaterial that such doctrine is incomprehensible to many people
. . . [t]he reasonableness of a religious belief is not subject to challenge here." State ex rel.
Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash.2d 860, 869, 239 P.2d 545, 550-51 (1952) (Hamley, J.,
dissenting).
